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Abstract 
Nigeria has had an uninterrupted democratisation wave since 1999 and the country has had 
its share of macroeconomic instability in terms of high rates of inflation and huge debt 
profile due to high cost of governance. Against this background, this study test the hypothesis 
that government in young democracies tend to generates large government size and test also 
the hypothesis that the outgoing dictatorships of the day engaged in activities which would 
bequest the young democracies big bills to be repaid at the initial stages of those new 
democratic regimes. Applying time series analysis on Nigeria data for the period of 1960 to 
2015, the study found that (i) democracy in Nigeria is associated with bigger government and 
huge public debts (ii) the hypothesis that outgoing dictatorship bequest the young 
democracies with big bills is not confirmed for Nigeria. Moreover, the study found evidence 
that as democracy mature over the long run, the size of government tends to decrease, this is 
suggestive that democracy needs time to adapt and evolve over time. This study has provided 
deeper understanding of the recent history of Nigeria in terms of its dynamics during political 
transitions.  
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1. Introduction 
The idea that political and institutional environments have the potential of influencing 
economic outcome has been around since the time of Adam Smith. However, the nature of 
influence and causation between political regimes and long-term economic performance has 
remained inconclusive. A literature survey by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) ends up 
with a wide range of estimates ranging from negative to positive (and significant to 
insignificant) relationship between democracy and economic growth. One reason for this 
inconclusiveness is theoretical as pointed out in Plumer and Martin (2003). The study posits 
that the controversy could be traced to the positions of Friedman (1962), which argues that 
the more democratic a country is, the higher the government’s incentive to implement sound 
economic institutions thus increasing the overall social well-being through its expenditures 
and Olson (1965;1982) who surmises that special interest groups are more likely to exert their 
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detrimental influence in democratic political systems than in autocracies, therefore resulting 
to more unproductive public spending at the expense of viable public investment. 
 Nigerian first democratic experience after independence in 1960 was aborted 
by military dictatorship in 1966 and the second republic of 1979 was also truncated by 
military coup in 1983. The political regimes presented in Table 1 shows that the share of 
public spending in GDP is reducing by each successive regime with an average of 0.35 (% of 
GDP). In case of public debt, it is observed that the regimes of military dictatorship incurred 
higher debt than their preceding democratic dispensation. For instance, public debt in Nigeria 
rose on the average from 0.36 per cent in the second republic to 0.98 per cent during the 
period 1984 – 1998.  The pattern of GDP growth does not follow a consistent form as the 
lowest (-1.65%) and highest (5.52%) growth are recorded during democratic regimes (the 
periods 1979-1983 and 1999-2015).  As such, establishing the relationship between political 
regimes and public sector indicators is not as simple as it appears. 
 
Table 1: Stylized fact on Average Public Spending, Public Debt and GDP growth in 
different Political regimes 
Year Political regime Average public 
spending  
(% of GDP) 
Average public debt 
(% of GDP) 
Average GDP 
growth (%) 
1960-1965 Democratic 
Regimes –  
First Republic 
0.69 0.62 3.81 
1966-1978 Military 
Regimes 
0.50 0.63 5.09 
1979 -1983 Democratic 
Regime –  
Second Republic 
0.22 0.36 -1.65 
1984 -1998 Military 
Regimes 
0.19 0.98 1.77 
1999 -2015 Democratic 
Regimes –  
Third Republic 
0.14 0.41 5.52 
1960-2015 All Regimes 0.35 0.60 2.91 
 
There is an extensive amount of academic literature dedicated to the relationship 
between democracy and economic growth (Przeworski et al.,1993; Heliwell, 1994 and Haan 
et al., 2005). Nevertheless, there are few existing studies that have considered the relationship 
between political regimes and the size of government. For instance, Aidt and Eterovic (2011) 
suggest that political competition has an inverse relationship with the size of government 
spending, while the opposite is true for political participation. Moreso, in the studies of 
Plümper and Martin (2003), Hausken et al. (2004) and Aidt et al. (2010), they establish that 
there exist a U-shaped relationship between democracy and government spending. Thereby, 
suggesting that for low levels of democracy public spending is high to meet the demands of 
elites, while for high levels of democracy the usual median voter‟s model prediction applies 
and public spending is high due to popular demand of public goods. However, for medium 
3 
 
levels of democracy, none of these pressures is active and government spending is at its 
minimum (Dizaji, Farzanegan and Naghavi, 2014). 
Most of the existing studies focused on advanced and emerging economies, with a 
few others focusing on developing Africa, but none on Nigeria. Therefore, this study 
contributes to the literature by examining the specific case of Nigeria on the influence of 
political regimes on the size of government. This is important because some studies do 
suggest that differences in the empirical results could be attributed to regional or individual 
countries differences. More so, with the assertion of Downs' (1957) that as a result of political 
competition, politicians in office will want to pursue their own goals, the most important of 
which is to maximize votes in the next election (in addition to expensive lifestyle of 
politicians and other public office holders), the question of whether government size will 
always be incremental becomes empirical matter.   
Upon the foregoing, this study tests three hypotheses – that government in young 
democracies tend to generates large government size, that the outgoing dictatorships of the 
day engaged in activities which would bequest the incoming democratic regimes with big 
bills to be repaid at the initial stages of those new administrations and lastly, that as 
democracy and government mature (in the long run), the size of government tends to 
decrease.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a theoretical 
perspective on size and growth of government in relation to growth, after which the data and 
method are described in section 3. Section 4 present and discuss empirical results and ends 
with concluding remarks in section 5. 
 
2. Data and Methods 
The data set for this study covers the period between 1960 and 2015 for Nigeria and all the 
data are sourced from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin. The variables used 
to measure the size of government are the share of external debt to GDP (gov1), total 
government expenditure as a share of GDP (gov2), share of recurrent expenditures to GDP 
(gov3) and total public debt to GDP (gov4). Following Bittencourt (2013) variables’ 
definitions, the study constructed different sets of dummy variables to account for the role of 
political regime characteristics on government size. The first one (Demo) accounts for the 
whole democratic period (a positive estimate suggests that the size of government increases 
under more democratic regimes). The second one is for the last four years of dictatorship 
(Junta), in which a negative and significant estimate indicates that the last dictator, did not 
engage in generating a bigger government (e.g. via higher debt and widespread 
consumption), which would leave the new democratic regime with significant bills and 
financial constraints in its initial stages. Lastly, we have a variable which counts the number 
of years after democratisation (Ndemo). In this case, a negative and significant estimate 
indicates that the size of government decreases with time, or alternatively that democracy, or 
the electorate, mature over time, or to put it another way, that governments become more 
responsible and efficient, or constrained, with a more mature electorate and better checks and 
balances in place.  
The study also includes some control variables often used in the literature and they are 
as follows: a measure for trade openness relative to GDP (Open) and it is expected that more 
open economies tend to display smaller governments (via higher exports taxes and imports 
tariffs). The share of the liquid liabilities to GDP (M2) is another explanatory variable and it 
is expected that in economies with better developed financial sectors governments can 
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acquire finance more easily and therefore increase in size via higher consumption and debt. 
The control variables gross domestic product (GDP) and its growth (Growth) capture the 
productivity capacity of the economy. It is expected that in economies with low gross 
domestic products, the size of government tends to be large and economies that are growing 
relatively fast during booms have the potentials of reducing their share of debt to GDP, 
subsequently engenders smaller government size. The last explanatory variable is inflation 
rates (Inf); it is expected that higher inflation, via higher nominal interest rates, leads to 
higher or even ballooning, debt, or bigger governments in general.  
 
Model Specification and Estimation Techniques 
Following earlier studies such as Adams and Sakyi (2012) and Bittencourt (2013), the basic 
models we estimated have the following specification; 
 
Model 1 – Whole Democratic Period 
gov t* = α0 + α1Demot + α2Opent + α3M2t + α4GDPt + α5Growtht + α6Inft + εt  (1) 
 
Model 2 – Last 4 years of Dictatorship 
gov t* = β0 + β1Juntat + β2Opent + β3M2t + β4GDPt + β5Growtht + β6Inft + εt  (2) 
 
Model 3 – Number of years of Democratisation 
gov t* = μ0 + μ1NDemot + μ2Opent + μ3M2t + μ4GDPt + μ5Growtht + μ6Inft + εt  (3) 
 
where gov t* stands for government size, measured as share of external debt to GDP (gov1), 
total government expenditure as a share of GDP (gov2), share of recurrent expenditures to 
GDP (gov3) and total public debt to GDP (gov4). 
In this study, we first examine the stationarity of our variables. A non-stationary time 
series has a different mean at different points in time, and its variance increases with the 
sample size (Harris and Sollis (2003). The problem with non-stationary data is that the 
standard OLS regression procedures can easily lead to incorrect conclusions (Asteriou and 
Hall, 2007). In the case of spurious regression, t-values of the coefficients are highly 
significant, coefficient of determination (R2) is very close to one and the Durbin Watson 
(DW) statistic value is very low, which often lead investigators to commit a high frequency 
of Type 1 errors. Mostly in the literature to find out the order of integration ADF (Dicky & 
Fuller, 1979) and PP (Philip & Perron, 1988) tests have been used extensively. Due to their 
poor size and power properties, both tests are not reliable for small sample data set (Dejong et 
al, 1992). These tests seem to over-reject the null hypotheses when it is true and accept it 
when it is false. While newly proposed tests such as Dicky-Fuller generalized least square 
(DF-GLS) detrending test developed by Elliot et al. (1996) seem to solve this arising 
problem. Hence, the unit root tests are conducted using DF-GLS. If a unit root is detected for 
more than one variable, we further conduct the test for cointegration employing Johansen 
system cointegration tests. The study thus employ ordinary least square (OLS) estimation 
technique for case where there is evidence of long run relationship among our variables of 
interest, with AR(1) errors (autoregressive error of order 1) to take into account the 
autocorrelation  
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3. Presentation of Results and Discussion 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics for the 1960-2015 Long Sample 
Figure 1 attempt to show the behaviour of the variables used as proxies for government size 
over time. We plot the normalised series of External Debt to GDP (gov1), Total Government 
Expenditures to GDP (gov2), Recurrent Expenditures to GDP (gov3) and Total Public Debt to 
GDP (gov4) for the period 1960-2015 against time. The four series show an increasing trend 
in the late 960s possibly due to Nigeria civil war. All the series except external debt plateau 
in 1969, suggesting that government finance her budget majorly internally. High public debt 
is associated with the era of political dictatorships (1983-1998) and it is observed that most 
series begin to record reduction in size from the 1999 onwards, which suggest that sometime 
after democratisation the size of those governments decreased (or returned to a sort of long-
run steady state). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: External Debt to GDP (gov1), Total Government Expenditures to GDP (gov2), 
Recurrent Expenditures to GDP (gov3) and Total Public Debt to GDP (gov4) for the period 
1960-2015. Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the government size and political regime variables  
 gov1 gov2 gov3 gov4 Demo Junta Ndemo 
 Mean  0.333043  0.309075  0.190132  0.642163  0.490909  0.109091  0.290909 
 Median  0.228408  0.189252  0.111582  0.485671  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Maximum  1.116107  1.566638  1.221234  2.371372  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000 
 Minimum  0.011583  0.087142  0.046062  0.084208  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.342480  0.303433  0.215761  0.538538  0.504525  0.314627  0.458368 
 Skewness  0.942916  2.382668  2.835815  1.200437  0.036370  2.507811  0.920737 
 Kurtosis  2.693440  8.652603  11.89138  4.180641  1.001323  7.289116  1.847756 
        
 Jarque-Bera  8.365358  125.2633  254.8882  16.40400  9.166671  99.80890  10.81367 
 Probability  0.015258  0.000000  0.000000  0.000274  0.010221  0.000000  0.004486 
        
 Sum  18.31735  16.99915  10.45728  35.31895  27.00000  6.000000  16.00000 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  6.333816  4.971879  2.513841  15.66125  13.74545  5.345455  11.34545 
        
 
The study also provides Descriptive Statistics for the government size and political regime 
variables in Table 2 and the correlation matrix of the key variables in Table 3, and the 
statistical correlations amongst our proxies for government size are all positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level except for external debt (gov1) and government 
spending (gov2 & gov3), which suggest that external loan are used for capital expenditure 
financing. The correlations amongst the proxies for government size and the dummy for the 
whole democratic period (Demo) are negative and statistically significant only for debt 
variables i.e gov1 and gov4. Similarly, the correlation amongst government size and the 
variable which counts the number of years after democratisation (Ndemo) are negative and 
statistically significant for all except for external debt (gov1). Lastly, the correlations amongst 
the proxies for government and the dummy for the last six years of those dictatorships (Junta) 
are not statistically significant.  
 
Table 3: The Correlation Matrix of Government size and Political Regime  
Variables gov1 gov2 gov3 gov4 Demo Junta Ndemo 
gov1 1.0000 
(----) 
      
gov2 0.1171 
(0.3944) 
1.0000 
(----) 
     
gov3 0.1304 
(0.3425) 
0.9852*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000 
(----) 
    
gov4 0.8092*** 
(0.0000) 
0.5960*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6173*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000 
(----) 
   
Demo -0.2927** 
(0.0301) 
-0.0921 
(0.5036) 
-0.0916 
(0.5059) 
-0.3511*** 
(0.0086) 
1.0000 
(----) 
  
Junta 0.1193 
(0.3856) 
-0.1450 
(0.2908) 
-0.1654 
(0.2274) 
0.0526 
(0.7028) 
-0.3436** 
(0.0102) 
1.0000 
(----) 
 
Ndemo -0.1467 
(0.2850) 
-0.3569*** 
(0.0075) 
-0.2922** 
(0.0304) 
-0.2744** 
(0.0426) 
0.6522*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2241 
(0.1000) 
1.0000 
(----) 
* represents significance at the 5% level, correlation (P-value) 
These preliminary correlations suggest that the size of government tend to reduce during the 
democratic period and with number of years of democratization. Moreover, there are no 
meaningful correlations indicating any harmful behaviour by the last dictator towards the new 
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regimes coming into power in terms of bequeathing the new democratic government with 
high debt. 
 
3.2 Result of DF-GLS Unit Root Test and Cointegration Tests 
Table 4: DF-GLS Unit Root Test 
Variables Statistics  
at level 
Statistics  
at first difference 
Decision 
gov1 -2.1265 -5.4968*** I(1) 
gov2 -3.6402** - I(0) 
gov3 -3.8101*** - I(0) 
gov4 -2.5292 -6.5624*** I(1) 
Demo -2.0474 -7.2992*** I(1) 
Junta -2.3490 -7.2190*** I(1) 
Ndemo -1.7474 -7.4196*** I(1) 
Open -1.7412 -8.2979*** I(1) 
M2 -2.5409 6.6488*** I(1) 
GDP -2.9053* -6.6078*** I(1) 
Growth -5.1105*** - I(0) 
Inf -3.4607** - I(0) 
Test critical values: -3.7586 (1% level), -3.1804 (5% level) & -2.8810 (10% level)  
 
The unit root results reported in Tables 4 show that total government expenditures, recurrent 
expenditures, GDP growth and inflation are stationary at level and the other variables are 
non-stationary at level but become stationary after taking their first difference i.e. I(1).  
Hence, the study applied Johansen cointegration tests to ascertain existence of long run 
relationship the variables. As suggested by Hualde (2006), the study tested for cointegration 
among the variables that are integrated of order one only.  
 
Table 5: Results of Johansen Cointegration tests 
Dependent 
Variables 
Model Number of Cointegrating Relations selected at 5%  
level (Intercept, No trend) 
Trace Statistic Max-Eig Statistic 
gov1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
gov2 1 2 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
gov3 1 2 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 1 
gov4 1 5 1 
2 5 1 
3 1 1 
 
The results of cointegration test presented in Table 5 suggested at least one cointegrating 
vectors for the models. Since the series are cointegrated, it becomes evident that long run 
relationship exists among the variables. We therefore proceed to estimate the long run 
regression models formulated in equations (1 – 3) and presented the result in Tables 5 - 7. 
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3.3 Result of Long Run Estimates 
Table 5: Regression results for Model 1 – Whole Democratic Period and Government 
size 
Variables gov1 gov2 gov3 gov4 
C 3.6011 
(0.1805) 
6.1889 
(0.1085) 
4.2653* 
(0.0730) 
16.8881** 
(0.0185) 
Demo 0.1662** 
(0.0184) 
0.0096 
(0.8292) 
-0.0018 
(0.9545) 
0.1859** 
(0.0383) 
Open -0.0446 
(0.5810) 
0.2108*** 
(0.0001) 
0.1826*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0102 
(0.9183) 
M2 -0.0024 
(0.5643) 
0.0003 
(0.9033) 
-0.0010 
(0.6092) 
-0.0065 
(0.2414) 
GDP -0.2481 
(0.0097) 
-0.3113*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2267*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.8551*** 
(0.0000) 
Growth -0.0018 
(0.4055) 
0.0038*** 
(0.0083) 
0.0047*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0049* 
(0.0784) 
Inf 0.000646 
(0.6495) 
0.0009 
(0.3347) 
0.0012* 
(0.0829) 
0.0028 
(0.1236) 
 
R
2
 0.8810 0.9337 0.9303 0.9200 
Adjusted R
2
 0.8629 0.9236 0.9197 0.9078 
Durbin-Watson 
Stat. 
1.4607 1.8998 11.9149 1.9565 
F-stat. 48.6588 92.654 87.7417 75.5958 
Prob.(F-
statistic) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(P-value in parentheses) 
 
Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of the dummy covering the whole democratic period 
against all the proxies for government size. Demo is found to be positive and significant at 5 
percent level only for the government size measured as share of debt to GDP (i.e both 
external debt, gov1 and total debt, gov4). These results suggest that the democratic period in 
Nigeria has been characterized by large debt profile.  
 
Table 6: Regression results for Model 2 – Last 4 years of Dictatorship and Government 
Size 
Variables gov1 gov2 gov3 gov4 
C 3.5034 
(0.203) 
6.1828 
(0.1134) 
4.2638*** 
(0.0726) 
16.9549* 
(0.0236) 
Junta -0.3317* 
(0.0003) 
0.0372 
(0.5373) 
0.0157 
(0.7231) 
-0.3210* 
(0.0075) 
Open -0.0225 
(0.758) 
0.2140* 
(0.0001) 
0.1827* 
(0.0000) 
0.0386 
(0.6867) 
M2 -0.0005 
(0.884) 
0.0003 
(0.8903) 
-0.0010 
(0.5924) 
-0.0043 
(0.4095) 
GDP -0.2188** -0.3081* -0.2268* -0.8185* 
9 
 
(0.0113) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Growth -0.0008 
(0.676) 
0.0003 
(0.0084) 
0.0047* 
(0.0000) 
0.0059** 
(0.0300) 
Inf 0.0006 
(0.614) 
0.0007 
(0.3897) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0857) 
0.0027 
(0.1214) 
 
R
2
 0.8988 0.9342 0.9305 0.9248 
Adjusted R
2
 0.8834 0.9242 0.9199 0.9134 
Durbin-Watson Stat. 1.4453 1.9024 1.9106 1.8782 
F-stat. 58.393 93.365 87.9955 80.9029 
Prob.(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
(P-value in parentheses) 
Table 6 present the result of exercise that tested for Nigeria the hypothesis that the outgoing 
dictatorships engaged in activities that would leave the young democracies with significant 
debt, and consequently high bills to be repaid at the initial stages of those new democratic 
administrations.  The estimates of Junta (which accounts for the last four years of 
dictatorship in Nigeria) against the different proxies for government size showed that it is 
negative and significant at 10 per cent level only for the government size measured as share 
of debt to GDP (external debt, gov1 and total debt, gov4). These negative estimates suggest 
that the outgoing dictatorship did not build up excessive debt for the incoming democratic 
administration before relinquishing power. In other words, the last junta did not bequest the 
new democratic regimes with large bills to be repaid in the initial stages of democratisation. 
 
Table 7: Regression results for Model 3 – Number of years of Democratisation 
Variables gov1 gov2 gov3 gov4 
C 2.7524 
(0.121) 
5.6190*** 
(0.0867) 
3.9273*** 
(0.0569) 
14.1857* 
(0.0065) 
Ndemo 0.5919* 
(0.000) 
0.1139 
(0.1837) 
0.0800 
(0.2025) 
0.6497* 
(0.0001) 
Open -0.0370 
(0.576) 
0.2102* 
(0.0001) 
0.1804* 
(0.0000) 
0.0311 
(0.7231) 
M2 -0.0027 
(0.434) 
0.0001 
(0.9626) 
-0.0012 
(0.5250) 
-0.0065 
(0.1789) 
GDP -0.2392* 
(0.002) 
-0.3118* 
(0.0000) 
-0.2291* 
(0.0000) 
-0.8301* 
(0.0000) 
Growth -0.0008 
(0.648) 
0.0003* 
(0.0057) 
0.0048* 
(0.0000) 
0.0060** 
(0.0172) 
Inf 0.0003 
(0.739) 
0.0009 
(0.3093) 
0.0012*** 
(0.0638) 
0.0024 
(0.1242) 
 
R
2
 0.9182 0.9362 0.9327 0.9378 
Adjusted R
2
 0.9058 0.9265 0.9225 0.9283 
Durbin-Watson Stat. 1.0329 1.8084 1.8877 1.7445 
F-stat. 73.831 96.469 91.163 99.132 
Prob.(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (P-value in parentheses) 
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The results of the estimates of the variable that measures the number of years after 
democratisation (Ndemo) in Nigeria since 1999 against all proxies for government size are 
reported in Table 7. These estimates are all positive, although not entirely statistically 
significant – total government expenditure, gov2 and recurrent government expenditure gov3 
are not statistically significant while total debt, gov4 and external gov1 are significant at 10 
per cent). These estimates are not suggesting that as democracy matures over time in Nigeria 
public spending and external debt as share of GDP is becoming any smaller.  
In sum, the study findings suggest that the young democracies of Nigeria run higher 
public and external debt as percentage of GDP. This position is supported by studies such as 
Brender and Drazen (2007) and Bittencourt (2013), which surmised that young democracies 
face many challenges from the outset among which are poor infrastructure, high inequality 
and need for redistribution of income, high expectation from the electorate to enjoy ‘dividend 
of democracy’.  Contrary to Alesina and Tabellini (1990), this study do not lend support to 
the proposition that those young democracies would inherit from the outgoing 
military/dictator, high levels of public debt or big bills to be repaid by those new democratic 
governments coming into power. Nevertheless, the finding of study favours the submissions 
of Bittencourt (2013) for South American democracies and Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 
(2004). 
The variables open present the expected negative only in model 1 (when government 
size was measured by external debt – gov1) however the estimate is not statistically 
significant. The estimate of trade openness is positive and significant at 10 per cent level for 
government spending (gov2 & gov3). Thus, the variable open does nor display the predicted 
effect that more open economies tend to lead to smaller governments through higher exports 
taxes and imports tariffs as channel of transmission. The estimate of M2 for all the models is 
negative except for Model 2 and not significant for all measures of government size. 
Therefore the hypothesis that government size increases via higher consumption and debt in 
economies where governments can acquire finance more easily with better developed 
financial sector is not supported. 
The coefficients of GDP and its growth (Growth) are expected to be negative. The 
estimates of GDP for the four models have expected negative sign and significant. This 
suggests that during economic backwardness, periods of low GDPs, the share of public 
spending and debt to GDP is enlarged. Whereas it is reported that GDP growth is positive and 
significant at 10 per cent level in the models except for external debt as share of GDP. These 
estimates suggest that higher growth increases the size of government, through growth in 
national income. This finding support the Wagner’s position on public spending – growth 
nexus. The result of the estimate of inflation provides evidence that inflation displays the 
expected effect of increasing government size probably via higher nominal interest rates, 
which ultimately leads to bloating debt and large governments. However, it is significant only 
for recurrent public expenditure (gov3).  
 
4.  Concluding Remark 
This study test the hypothesis that government in young democracies tend to generates large 
government size and test also the hypothesis that the outgoing dictatorships of the day 
engaged in activities which would bequest the young democracies big bills to be repaid at the 
initial stages of those new democratic regimes. Applying time series analysis on Nigeria data 
for the period of 1960 to 2015, the study found that democracy in Nigeria is associated with 
bigger government and huge public debts. This evidence indicates that indicates that young 
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democracies will become more responsible overtime, and perhaps become more conservative, 
in terms of public spending and debt as share of GDP in other word there is a learning 
process within democracies. Hence, Hayek’s claim as pointed out in Bittencourt (2013) that 
the benefits of democracy comes in the long run in the terms of reduction in debt burden and 
government efficiency.  
More so, the hypothesis that outgoing dictatorship bequest the young democracies 
with big bills is not confirmed for Nigeria. This finding might be contrary to the popular 
opinion that the military governments usually loot the treasury before they exit. Moreover, 
the study found evidence that as democracy mature over time (in the long run), the size of 
government tends to decrease. This suggests that democracy needs time to adapt and evolve 
over time. Thus, the study provides deeper understanding of the recent development in 
developing West African nations such as Nigeria in terms of its dynamics during political 
transitions. 
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